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Water Reforms in Brazil: Opportunities and Constraints 
 
 
Abstract: The last decade saw repeated attempts to adopt and implement an integrated 
management of water in Brazil. Internationally established principles, such as water 
economics and public participation, have influenced the development of a novel regulatory 
framework for water use and conservation in the country. However, despite changes in 
policies and in the legislation, the opportunity to address old and new management problems 
has been largely frustrated by the internal contradictions of the ongoing institutional reforms. 
A case study of the Paraíba do Sul River Basin demonstrates the distance between, on one 
hand, calls for decentralisation and responsibility sharing and, on the other hand, the 
persistence of bureaucratised and exclusionary practices. The main distortion is the excessive 
effort expended on the introduction of water pricing and environmental charges, a 
controversial policy instrument that has dominated the agenda of the new river basin 
committee, at the expense of addressing river restoration, public mobilisation and 
environmental justice.   
 
Key words: water regulation, IWRM, water charges, water pricing, public participation, 
Paraíba do Sul, Brazil. 
 
 
Introduction   
 
The control and management of water resources played an important role in the 
industrialization and urbanization of Brazil in the last century. Particularly since the early 
1930s, the exploitation of rivers, lakes, groundwater and the coast became an integral part of 
national and regional development programmes. In a few decades, the accelerated rates of 
economic growth, combined with inadequate environmental regulation and deficient public 
services, created a situation of growing environmental degradation and manmade water 
scarcity in many parts of the country (Ioris, 2007). It was especially during the military 
dictatorship (1964-1985) that hardcore economic development was exploited as a main 
legitimating strategy for the ruling regime. It was only after the end of the dictatorship that an 
open debate on the need to reform water regulation became politically possible. It took more 
than a decade of congressional discussion to approve the new Water Act in 1997 (Law 
9433/1997), which primarily aims at the restoration of the environmental condition of water 
bodies and the improvement of water use efficiency. The main forum for stakeholder 
participation under the new law is the river basin committee, which congregates 
representatives from water users, government and civil society. The legislation introduced 
new regulatory instruments, such as plans, licences and environmental charges, and 
 2 
established the National Water Resources Management System (SINGREH).1 Crucially, the 
new legal framework encapsulates a fundamental tension between social and environmental 
demands and an increased emphasis on the economic value of water resources. This tension 
corresponds to the contrast in the priorities of local communities, business sectors and 
governmental agencies. As pointed out by Mollinga (2008), changes in water management 
are not simply a technical problem, but water politics are at the heart of its policies and 
management approaches. 
In order to understand the ongoing reforms, it is necessary to recognise the influence 
of multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, IADB, GEF and JBIC, on development of 
new policies and legislation in Brazil. These international organisations have sponsored the 
production of prominent technical guidance (e.g. the Water Resources Series published by 
the World Bank in 2003) and financed key infrastructure and capacitation programmes (the 
Federal Water Resources Management Project (PROAGUA) funded by the World Bank in 
1997). According to Conca (2006), one of the most important principles that was exported to 
Brazil and influenced the emerging regulation is the concept of integrated water resources 
management (IWRM), which is defined by Davis (2007) as “a facilitated stakeholder process 
to promote coordinated activities in pursuit of common goals for multiple objective 
development and management of water founded in sustainable water resource systems” (see 
also Global Water Partnership, 2003). To a large extent, the IWRM doctrine provided the 
conceptual and methodological rationale for the new public policies and regulatory 
instruments that are now being applied to the solution of water problems in Brazil. It is 
relevant to mention also that the introduction of new water regulation in Brazil also coincided 
with a period of economic adjustment and reorientation of the role of the national state (The 
Economist, 14 Apr 2007), under pressures for market liberalisation and deeper insertion into 
the global economy (Mollo and Saad-Filho, 2006). The new economic policies and neoliberal 
development strategies have significantly shifted the framing of water problems and the 
formulation of (public and private) responses.  
The aim of this essay is to examine the extent that the institutional water reforms have 
been able to answer to the pressing demands for environmental restoration and conflict 
resolution in Brazil. Our research focuses on a case study of the Paraíba do Sul River Basin 
(henceforth, PSRB). The analysis was based on a preparatory fieldtrip in 2006 and a main 
data collection campaign between March and May of 2007. In addition to informal contacts 
with local stakeholders, twenty semi-structured, confidential interviews were carried out 
(most were later complemented by further e-mail discussions) with industrialists, sanitation 
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companies, NGOs, government officials (from municipal, state and federal agencies) and 
river basin committee members. The study also involved content analysis of documentation 
and attendance to open meetings (including sessions of the river basin committee). The 
research followed the recommendation of Watts and Peet (2004) that the investigation of the 
relations between events, structures and mechanisms, through a stratified sense of reality, can 
deploy a toolkit to explain the world via the reconstruction of existing theories about 
ecological questions. Sayer (1992) also points out that explanation in social sciences emerges 
from the dialectical movement from the abstract (the isolation of particular attributes and 
relationships from the whole) and the concrete (the multiplicity of structures and events that 
comprise the world). Santos (2002a) adds that the researcher needs to recognize the causal 
powers of particular aspects (such as water charges and public participation in the case of this 
study) that have autonomy but are at the same time integral parts of the concrete totality. 
Before moving to the case study, it is first necessary to explore in more detail the IWRM 
proposition.  
 
Interrogating the Institutional Water Reforms 
 
There is a growing awareness around the world today of problems related to water 
use and conservation, ranging from local issues, such as river pollution and lack of water 
supply, to global challenges associated with climate change and desertification. This rising 
concern with the need to better manage water systems is reflected in the daily coverage of the 
mass media and in the work of academics and universities (for example, in Britain alone 
there are more than 60 master degrees on water-related topics). Issues of water management 
are certainly not new, but had already been considered by economists, engineers and 
philosophers at least since the 19th century. In the first decades of the 20th century, water 
management became associated with regional development and economic growth, such as 
the experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the 1930s. The TVA example 
later influenced the construction of dams and expansion of water infrastructure all over the 
world (e.g. some of the largest dams were built in Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s). However, 
before too long, it became evident that water engineering and the unchecked exploitation of 
water resources were causing widespread environmental impacts and, in many cases, 
frustrating public demands. Concepts and techniques started to be revised in the last quarter 
of the 20th century and began to emphasise the integration of environmental conservation 
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with multiple uses of water and the interface with other landscape processes (such as land use 
and urban expansion).  
The concept that better epitomises the contemporary attempts to improve water 
management is the aforementioned IWRM (Molle, 2006), which has two fundamental pillars: 
public participation and the recognition of the economic value of water. Other related 
notions, such as ‘adaptive management’ and a ‘transition management’, have also expanded 
the academic literature that underpins the institutional reforms in the water sector (Craswell 
et al., 2007). One of the best examples of the translation of such concepts into public policies 
was the approval of the Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC) in Europe in the 
year 2000, a comprehensive piece of legislation that try to address water problems from 
‘source to mouth’. However, the transition from old to new approaches, in Europe and 
elsewhere, has not been without tension and controversy. On the contrary, there have been 
major difficulties to follow the timetable and the objectives set up by the new water policies 
(European Commission, 2007). To comprehend the controversies around the current attempts 
to regulate and manage water, it is necessary to examine the contradictions of the governing 
theory of water regulation. Technical insufficiencies, local resistance by water mangers and 
lack of coordination between public agencies have already been identified as serious 
limitations of the new approaches (e.g. Fischhendler, 2008; Funke et al., 2007), but the more 
fundamental weaknesses of the IWRM doctrine are not normally acknowledged. For 
explanatory purposes, Table 1 presents a typology of the intrinsic shortcomings of the IWRM 
model, which are discussed below.  
 
Table 1. Intrinsic Limitations of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM ) 
Limitation Key Evidences Negative Consequences 
Epistemological vague conceptualisation on what should be integrated 
analytic confusion; reductionist 
agenda of integration  
Operational uncertainty on how to integrate and the sequence of steps 
little improvement; 
implementation gridlock 
Political top-down water reforms; decisions controlled by the stronger groups   
emergence/maintenance of 
conflicts; elite capture 
 
Epistemological limitation: despite numerous efforts to conceptualise the meaning of 
integrated water management, its epistemological grounds remain unclear and uncertain. 
Although many scholars insist on the need to converge plans and integrate procedures (e.g. 
Bongartz, 2003; Faby et al., 2005; Hendry, 2006), the mechanisms and the details of 
integration are hardly ever explained. Quite the opposite: most of the literature presents 
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IWRM as a vague combination of aspirational (i.e. something needs to be done to solve 
current water problems) and exhortative measures (i.e. all sectors and groups should be 
involved in shared problems), without indicating how the communication between 
geographical areas and water user sectors can be achieved. Instead of resolving the 
elusiveness behind the principle of integration, some authors suggest an association of 
IWRM with other regulatory mechanisms, such as with the planning system (Kidd and Shaw, 
2007), but this strategy is not able to elucidate how integration can be achieved. Others 
advocate the simple abandonment of IWRM objectives, such as Biswas (2008), who prefers a 
return to the narrow, technical approaches that characterised the past decades of water 
management. There is an obvious parallel here with similar concepts like sustainability or 
democracy, which produce only a superficial level of agreement, whilst the more tangible 
implications remain ambiguous and contested.  
 
Operational limitation: because of its fluid conceptualisation, there has been a constant 
hesitation among water managers to adopt the IWRM methodology. Anand (2007) criticises 
the fact that, according to IWRM, all water users should be allocated to uses that maximize 
the net benefits, regardless of whether they are in an upstream state or a downstream state, 
and irrespective of group differences and cultural issues. Because of this idealised approach 
to water problems, IWRM is possible only if there is high degree of cooperation between 
water users and, in the case of a water dispute, “IWRM can at best be a distant goal” and “it 
is not clear whether it can guarantee sustainability requirements” (Anand, 2007: 115). 
Because elusive claims for wide-ranging integration alone seem unable to offer much 
guidance, practitioners and regulators tend to pick and choose only those aspects of the 
IWRM that appear more feasible. The recent experience shows that in many cases where 
IWRM has been tried, local water managers are inclined to drop the more ambitious goals of 
integration and normally restrict their intervention to a small number of workable 
management options (Blomquist and Schlager, 2005). Attempts to integrate policy reforms 
and achieve better water governance (as postulated by Galaz, 2007) are also constrained by 
the policy inertia settled over environmental regulatory agencies (Kirk et al., 2007).  
 
Political limitation: the epistemological and operational limits of IWRM mentioned above 
seem to have a more elemental source, which is the difficulty to accept the politicised basis 
of water management. There is a persistent reluctance among decision-makers to recognise 
the mechanisms of exclusion from access to water, or the relationship between flows of water 
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and the circulation of power and money (Swyngedouw, 2004). Most of those sponsoring the 
IWRM agenda hesitate to admit that the differences between social groups can have a major 
influence on water allocation and on the distribution of negative impacts. It has been 
observed elsewhere that a critical limitation of IWRM is the entrenched mindset of water 
managers and hydrologists, who consider socioeconomic and political issues a deviation 
from the ‘purist’ goals of water management (McCulloch and Ioris, 2007). Some may even 
concede the relevance of political disputes, but argue that water conflicts as merely a form of 
circumstantial nuisances to be overcome or avoided and not a permanent feature of water 
management (Blomquist and Schlager, 2005). Many attempts that try to relate water 
management with broader governmental reforms also fail to hit the political core and, in 
particular, ignore complex social, economic, material and discursive arrangements (Köhler, 
2005). Against the denial of the political dimension of water management, Swatuk (2005) 
recommends that it is important to reconsider and be prepared to revise the basic assumptions 
driving IWRM-based reforms. 
 
 
Because of the these intrinsic shortcomings, many experiences informed by the IWRM 
theory have fallen short of addressing the full extent of the nexus between economic growth, 
environmental degradation and socio-political injustices. That represents is a major weakness 
of the new regulation model, specially considering that, in countries such as Brazil, conflicts 
over natural resources are linked to systems of political control established since the colonial 
period (Bryant, 1998). It is not by chance that the same groups with less political power 
normally have fewer opportunities to have access to natural resources and suffer from a 
lower quality of the local environment. Social inequalities are systematically translated into 
an asymmetric distribution of information (Goldin et al., 2008), the exclusion of the weaker 
groups from water regulation (Zhouri and Oliveira, 2005) and the centralisation of the 
decision-making in the hands of higher authorities (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006; van der 
Zaag, 2005). Conventional approaches to public participation, such as advocated by IWRM, 
have a tendency to override existing decision-making processes, reinforce the interests of the 
already powerful and remove other perfectly legitimate management mechanisms (cf. Cooke 
and Kothari, 2001). The alternative is the promotion of genuine participatory strategies, 
which require both the transfer of power to the local level and an effective accountability of 
the political representation (Larson and Ribot, 2004; Ribot, 2002). Hickey and Mohan (2005) 
indicate that participatory approaches are more likely to succeed where they are pursued as 
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part of a wider radical political project with the involvement of currently marginalized 
groups.  
The remaining of this essay will discuss the IWRM experience in the PSRB in the light 
of the above observations. This is a river basin where old management approaches, based on 
supply augmentation and river engineering, are now being replaced by new practices based 
on demand management inspired by the IWRM theory. Despite changes in the official 
discourse of governmental agencies and the local river basin committee, the next pages will 
show that the inherent limitations of IWRM-informed regulation have prevented the 
achievement of satisfactory responses to environmental and social problems. The main 
innovative contribution of this study is the fact that, while some publications have addressed 
the problems of water management in the PSRB, less attention has been given to the power 
nuances of the water regulatory reforms. 
 
Case study of the Paraíba do Sul River Basin (PSRB) 
 
The river basin 
 
The PSRB is located in the southeast of Brazil (Figure 1) and is one of the country’s 
most dynamic economic areas, currently responding for around 11 per cent of the national 
GDP. Its strategic locaton and the abundance of natural resources provided favourable 
conditions for the expansion of cities, industries and agriculture in the river basin.2 Already 
in the 18th Century, the Paraíba do Sul was the main communication route between the coast 
(Rio de Janeiro) and inland gold mines in the state of Minas Gerais. With the introduction of 
coffee production in the 1770s, vast areas of land were cleared in the river basin and the 
natural vegetation removed to open space for plantation farms.3 By the end of the 19th 
Century, because of the significant rates of soil erosion and land degradation, coffee 
production started to decline. A new and stronger economic phase commenced around 1900 
with the opening of textile and food industries in the Paraíba do Sul. The most significant 
milestone was the foundation in 1941 of the National Steel Company, the fist major steel 
plant in Brazil. The proximity to the main consumer centres (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) 
facilitated the rapid development of a diversified industrial activity (Müller, 1969), which 
currently includes more than 8,500 manufacturing units (CEIVAP, 2001). In addition, there 
are more than 120 hydropower stations in operation in the river basin (seven with more than 
50MW of installed capacity).  
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Figure 1: The Paraíba do Sul River Basin between the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de 
Janeiro in the southeast of Brazil (Source: CEIVAP, 2001) 
 
Coffee production and industrialisation marked the development in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, but economic growth came at a high environmental cost. If the local economy 
benefited from the strategic location and abundance of natural resources in the river basin, 
economic development left a lasting legacy of river degradation and stakeholder conflicts 
(Aquino and Farias, 1998). It led to serious disputes between upstream and downstream 
water users related to the impacts of environmental degradation and the failure to observe 
environmental legislation (Gruben et al., 2002). Treacherous biological conditions are 
particularly evident in the middle section of the Paraíba do Sul River where most of industry 
and hydroelectricity are located (Araujo et al. 2003). The more polluted river stretches have 
rates of coliform bacteria between 50 and 160 times the legal threshold; water pollution is 
aggravated by the fact that only 17.6% of the catchment sewage receives some form of 
treatment (Coppetec, 2006).4 The total rate of water demand amounts to 263 m3/s, which 
represents a significant pressure on available water resources (it is more than 74% of the low 
flows - see reference to Q95 in ‘note 2’). In addition, there are 256 sites of sand extraction for 
civil engineering, where the total evaporation of water (i.e. water loss) is equivalent to the 
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water demanded by 326,000 inhabitants or 6% of the river basin population (Dos Reis et al., 
2006).5  
  
The introduction of the new regulatory framework  
 
During most of the 20th century, water management in the PSRB was characterised by 
the expansion of urban water use and hydropower generation. Because of the low levels of 
investment in effluent treatment and environmental restoration, in a few decades the quality 
of the environment in the main river and in many of its tributaries was seriously 
compromised. The decision on where and how to manage water was centralised on the hands 
of the central government and followed mainly technical and economic criteria. The first, 
timid efforts to regulate water use in the PSRB took place in the upstream section (in the 
state of São Paulo) in 1939 with the organisation of the Paraíba Valley Improvements 
Service, an initiative inspired in the TVA experience and that aimed the hydroelectric 
exploitation of the river basin. The federal government’s initial attempt to deal with the 
mounting water problems was the formation of the Paraíba do Sul Valley Commission 
(COVAP) in 1968. The commission was unsuccessful and was replaced in 1979 by a 
multiministerial committee (CEEIVAP), also with negligible results. The membership in 
both organisations was restricted to public agencies and civil servants, with limited input 
from water users and other stakeholders. The PSRB became notorious as an area with serious 
water quality and quantity problems, while national and state administrations were doing 
little to reverse the downward environmental trend (see CEIVAP, 2001).  
It was only in the 1990s, when the level of pollution started to attract international 
condemnation and the reform of the national regulatory framework was being discussed in 
the parliament, that the Paraíba do Sul River Basin Committee (CEIVAP) was eventually 
established. CEIVAP is the official forum for debating long-term plans, addressing specific 
water problems and approving water charges (while the responsibility for issuing water 
licences and charging water users remains with the National Water Agency, ANA, the state 
regulator for rivers under the jurisdiction of the federal government).6 The committee was 
certainly not established in a political vacuum (Gruben et al., 2002), but as a result of a long 
mobilization in the river basin (always stronger in the state of São Paulo) and in the whole 
country (the committee was in fact created in 1996, but was already under the spirit of the 
impending new legislation [which was passed in 1997]). As repeatedly stated in the official 
publications, the new committee was formed under the influence of the IWRM principles of 
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catchment integration and stakeholder participation. CEIVAP approved two master plans that 
guide the regulatory reforms in the river basin: one for the period 2002-2006 and the second 
for 2007-2010 (not publicly available at the time of this writing in 2008). The plans contain a 
long list of interventions designed to restore the main river and many of its tributaries; 
nonetheless, both plans fail to provide a clear strategic direction for dealing with 
environmental impacts, which leaves room for controversy and disputes (see discussion 
below).  
Because of the relevance of the local experience for the national water policies, since 
its early days the federal government provided constant support for the organisation of 
CEIVAP (Braga et al., 2005). The new committee, therefore, was much better posited to deal 
with environmental problems than its predecessors. However, despite the institutional 
improvement, environmental degradation remains virtually unchanged in the river basin, as 
extensively documented in the master plans and by the environmental surveying services. 
The river basin continues to suffer from untreated domestic sewerage, industrial effluent 
discharge, sand mining and over extraction of water (cf. Araujo et al., 2003; Carvalho and 
Magrini, 2006; Pereira et al., 2006). In our interviews, various stakeholders expressed their 
concern about the competence of the new committee to deal with old and new water 
management problems. One major problem has been the difficulty that CEIVAP has to 
integrate federal and state regulation (the former applies to the main river and major 
tributaries, and the latter applies to the remaining tributaries).7 The dual nature of water 
regulation (i.e. federal and state responsibilities for the same river system) is frequently 
blamed for the difficulty to implement the new water legislation in the large Brazilian river 
basins. In the PSRB alone, 13 tributaries or sections of the PSRB have their own sub-basic 
committees or their own consortium of municipalities, which not necessarily communicate to 
each other or with the overall catchment committee (CEIVAP).8 It is perhaps ironic that the 
same reforms that aimed to advance integrated water management ended up creating a large 
fragmentation by tributaries and sub-basins.  
However, although the internal disputes between sub-basin committees represent a 
real challenge for the modern regulation of water in the PSRB, the persistency of 
environmental degradation seems to suggest some more fundamental inadequacies in the new 
regulatory framework. During our research, it was not difficult to realise that, in the last 
decade, most of the catchment plans and CEIVAP activities have evolved around a single 
issue: the implementation of bulk water charges (i.e. water pricing). The priority given to the 
internal details of the new charging scheme was so dominant and time consuming that 
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virtually shifted the focus of the committee away from environmental and social questions.9 
The discussion about the charges emerged in 2000, when several committee members 
defended the need to reduce the financial dependency from central government grants. 
Between 2000 and 2002, opinions against and in favour of charges split the committee into 
two polarised views. In favour of bulk water charges were the federal government, academics 
and some NGOs. Against the charges were the representatives of agriculture, hydroelectricity 
and industry (see FIRJAN, 2002). The fierce debate about the charges, instead of improving 
the quality of stakeholder engagement, started to ruin the initial enthusiasm about the new 
committee.  
In 2002, the contention took an unexpected turn when the industrial sector changed 
their position and agreed with the proposed charging scheme.10 Apparently, the industrialists 
listened to the arguments and changed their opinion in line with the new regulatory model. 
However, the real reason was rather more mundane: the industry preferred to take a proactive 
action in order to secure reduced fees and avoid close regulatory scrutiny. Instead of a 
democratic mechanism of decision-making, water policies were being manipulated by the 
stronger politico-economic players with only marginal contribution from the other 
stakeholders involved in the committee. The controversy about charges has, in effect, 
prevented the committee from considering in detail the environmental problems and social 
issues related to water in the river basin. For instance, during these negotiations, the position 
of the industrial sector was curiously supported by the environmental NGOs, which declined 
to impose higher charges alleging that that it was better to settle the matter at once. The 
contrast between the institutionalisation of public participation channels and the capture of 
the decision-making process by the stronger groups (‘elite capture’, according to Ribot, 
2002) has significantly undermined the legitimacy of the new regulatory approaches, without 
producing the results that were expected, as we see next. 
 
The narrow results of charging bulk water in the PSRB 
 
Charging bulk water has been the central policy instrument of the new water 
regulation in the PSRB and constitutes the most evident expression of the IWRM-based 
regulation in the river basin. On paper, it was claimed that the new charging scheme (an 
economic instrument of environmental policy based on the polluter-pays principle) would 
allow for the mitigation of the environmental passive, induce rational use of water and 
reallocate water according to economic efficiency (Garrido, 2004). In practice, however, 
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despite all the controversy surrounding its adoption, income has remained low and has been 
spent on administration costs or on isolated projects. Despite of the tiny environmental 
contribution of the new charging scheme, something that is accepted even by mainstream 
economists that helped to introduce the new regulation (e.g. Azevedo and Baltar, 2005), its 
implementation remains a very divisive matter. The difficulty to translate charges into 
environmental restoration in the Paraíba do Sul was early identified by academics that 
investigated the local circumstances (cf. Santos, 2002b), but a few years down the line it is 
still rare to find an independent assessment of the concrete results of the new policy 
instrument. On the contrary, most publications tend replicate the discourse of official 
agencies and multilateral organisations (for instance, Braga et al., 2008). In order to present a 
more objective evaluation of bulk water charges in the PSRB, we will follow here the five 
criteria for the success of economic instruments applied to environmental management 
proposed by the OECD (1991), namely, environmental effectiveness, equity, acceptability, 
administrative feasibility and cost, and economic efficiency.  
In terms of its effectiveness, the introduction of bulk water charges has offered a very 
limited contribution to restoring the environmental condition of the PSRB. Acselrad et al. 
(2007) compared the scale of the environmental problems with the initiatives funded by the 
revenues obtained from the charges and concluded that the current mechanism is clearly 
inadequate to revert the extension of the environmental impacts. Between 2003 and 2006, the 
charging scheme was responsible for collecting a total of R$ 25.4 million, which is 
considerably less than the estimated need to restore the catchment: R$ 360 million per year in 
capital investments or R$ 4,600 million by 2025 (Coppetec, 2006).11 In the year 2006, R$ 7.1 
millions were spent in fourteen municipalities, but the money went to short-lived projects 
with little capacity to produce environmental improvement. Notwithstanding the limited 
environmental improvement obtained from such initiatives, competition for financial 
resources is fierce in the committee (cf. Nunes Jr., 2007). As mentioned in our interviews, 
there is plenty of lobbying during the selection of proposals, which only helps to poison the 
dialogue between CEIVAP members and increases the suspicion of the general public about 
the real purposes of the whole regulatory system. One interviewee observed that:  
 
“The distortion in the new [water management] system is evident; there is only mobilisation where 
there is water charge. Such has been the official policy, but the problem is that it restricts the 
discussion [in the committee] to the new charges” – school teacher and observer of CEIVAP activities 
(interview in Apr. 07)  
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Regarding the second OECD criterion - equity - there are two main problems 
associated with the current charging scheme mechanism. First, at the moment there is no 
provision to compensate for the environmental degradation caused in the past by sectors like 
agriculture, mining and industry. In the case of the PSRB, some companies have been using 
and degrading the river for decades, while other users arrived in more recent times; even so, 
both groups bear the same charges. It means an unequal allocation of responsibilities, 
considering the cumulative (historical) contribution to the environmental degradation. That 
can be described as a perverse cross-subsidy between past and present, given that current 
water users subsidise, in the form of bulk water charges, those that benefited from the river in 
the past. Second, when commercial firms and water companies are charged, they can easily 
transfer the financial levy to their customers. It means that the additional environmental costs 
are passed on to prices, what reduces the chance for a ‘just’ distribution of responsibilities 
and only increases the position of the privileged groups (as observed by Enzensberger, 1996). 
Moving to the third criterion - acceptability - the level of suspicion and 
misinformation about the new water charging mechanism in the river basin remains very 
high. Among those supposed to pay for water use in 2004, more than haft of water users 
refused or delayed their payment, which to a large extent can be related to a perceived lack of 
legitimacy of the new regulatory regime (Soares, 2005). In addition, as can be seen in Figure 
2, the income remains fairly constant since 2003, which suggests that acceptability is not 
improving. Among all sectors, the industrial stakeholders have taken the most opportunistic 
approach to the bulk water charges: despite the fact that their political representation in the 
river basin committee, via the federation of the states of São Paulo (FIESP), Rio de Janeiro 
(FIRJAN) and Minas Gerais (FIEMG), agreed with the charges (as mentioned above), a 
significant proportion of the industrialists still maintain their dissatisfaction and refuse to 
make payments for their use of water (Féres et al., 2005). It should be added, that among 
those that agreed to pay, many industrialists have done so mainly to improve the public 
image of their companies (a manoeuvre that is normally termed ‘corporate green-wash’), as 
pointed out in several of our interviews.  
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Figure 2: Monthly Revenues from Water Charges in the Paraíba do Sul River Basin                                 
between March 2003 and April 2007 (in Brazilian Reais – R$) 
(Data Source: CEIVAP database)  
 
Regarding the fourth criterion - administrative feasibility - the experience in the 
PSRB has been far from straightforward. To a great extent, the catchment paid the price for 
being the first to adopt bulk water charges. Because of the limited administrative structure, in 
the initial stages the revenues were managed directly by the National Water Agency (ANA). 
But, because ANA is a public organisation, the income from charges was considered by the 
Treasury as indistinguishable from other forms of taxes, which wrongly led to the arrest of 
the income by the Treasury. Such flagrant distortion produced nationwide criticism and, in 
2004, a new law was passed to facilitate the administration of funds directly by the river 
basin committee. To some extent, the new administrative solution means (relative) immunity 
from the fiscal voracity of the Treasury. Nonetheless, there still remains the problem related 
to the sharing of responsibility between the federal and state administrations, which means 
that the Paraíba do Sul is supposed to have four different charging mechanisms, one for the 
main river and additional three for the tributaries located within the states (at the moment, 
only water use from the main river is the object of a full charging mechanism, but the three 
states are beginning the implementation of their own schemes). 
Probably the main failure of the PSRB charging mechanism is related to the fifth 
criterion: economic efficiency. In neoclassical economic terms, high level of efficiency 
means optimal allocation of resources according to maximum marginal utility and low-cost 
regulation compliance. However, thus far the new water charges have neither influenced the 
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reallocation of water in the catchment, nor curbed the expansion of water use. On the 
contrary, the fundamental objective of the charging scheme has simply been the generation of 
income rather than incentives to stimulate efficiency and sustainable water use (cf. Formiga-
Johnsson et al. 2007). For instance, in a survey with 488 industrial facilities in the catchment, 
Féres et al. (2008) found that, at least during the initial implementation period, water charges 
were not an effective mechanism to reduce effluent discharge. The same issue was 
highlighted in one of our interviews: 
 
“The main ‘service’ associated to water charges was the improvement of the image of large 
multinational companies, because they use the payment for charges as means to get international 
environmental certification.(…) The initial environmental improvement [of the river status] is 
relatively easy, the [key] problem is how to progress further in terms of water quality” - academic and 
former member of CEIVAP (interview in Apr. 07). 
 
For all the above reasons, it seems that the opportunity to improve water management 
has been largely wasted in the river basin under strong pressures for the adoption of water 
pricing exerted by the federal government. It confirms the observation by Brannstrom (2004: 
217) that “[a]lthough goals of decentralisation may include better environmental 
management and more responsive government, the ultimate objective of reforms [in Brazil] 
is to implement water tariff schemes to fund water-related investments at the watershed 
scale”. As long pointed out by Kapp (1970), the underlying problem behind the adoption of 
market-based instruments of environmental management, such as bulk water charges, is that 
a monetary value (i.e. charge) is conferred to a non-mercantile resource (i.e. water); it 
therefore subverts the value relation between market and non-market attributes and dislocate 
environmental conservation. The treatment of water stakeholders according to their payment 
capacity has further eroded the differences between groups and, consequently, hidden the 
different responsibilities for the past and the present degradation of the PSRB. In other 
words, bulk water charges have provided a political excuse for not questioning the location, 
scale and operation of high impact activities. Finally, although the income generated has 
contributed little to restore the environmental condition of the river system, the controversy 
on the charges has virtually hijacked the discussion about water management in the river 
basin. Instead of creating synergisms between state and society, the persistent focus on 
charges has widened the communication gap between stakeholder groups.  
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The hierarchy of water stakeholders 
 
The fact that, since its inception, most of the activities of the river committee have 
focused on the organisation and implementation of a charging scheme indicates the 
hegemony of a particular rationale of water management (i.e. the IWRM principles). The 
formalist objectives and the controversial nature of the charging scheme have operated as a 
barrier for the involvement of social movements and more grassroots organisations in the 
river basin committee. Despite the rhetoric of public participation and decentralisation, the 
activities of the river committee remain alien and unaccountable to the majority of water 
stakeholders. On the contrary, the reform of the institutions of water management has 
evolved towards discrimination and fragmentation, which was recurrent opinion expressed 
by some critical stakeholders at our interviews:  
 
“The conflicts around water are silent, unnoticed [in the PSRB]; (…) what is lacking in the whole 
process is public participation and real popular involvement” - local resident and member of CEIVAP 
(interview in Apr. 07) 
 
“There is major lack of transparency in the approval of the river basin plan and other strategic 
documents (…).  I would say, well, I am sure that there is really a lack of transparency”- solicitor and 
member of CEIVAP (interview in Apr. 07) 
 
“The complexity of the new water regulation was underestimated when the new law [9433] was 
passed; (…) [because of the unexpected complexity] in practical terms, the decisions are now made 
behind closed doors and with minimal stakeholder input”- sanitation engineer and member of 
CEIVAP (interview in Apr. 07). 
 
The minutes of the CEIVAP meeting between 2000 and 2008 (available at 
www.ceivap.org.br) demonstrate that, when some member of the committee tried to discuss 
other questions, such as water pollution, upstream-downstream water conflicts or even 
environmental education, these ‘inconvenient’ voices were promptly quieted by the chairman 
on grounds of not being part of the agenda. For example, on 12/02/2004, Mr Jorge 
questioned about the differences between rates of water use in the states of São Paulo and 
Rio de Janeiro, but the discussion went no further. Similarly, on 19/10/2006, Mr Souza 
briefly complained about serious degradation in the lower section of the river and achieved 
nothing. The most illustrative example of the incapacity of CEIVAP to resolve conflicts in an 
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equitable manner was the debate about authorising the Itaocara hydropower plant, a scheme 
with 195 MW of installed capacity and 76 km2 of reservoir area. On 23/08/2005, some 
members defended the project, but it was then challenged by a NGO representative. A new 
discussion was scheduled for the next meeting, which happened on 16/09/2005. Inexplicably, 
the meeting only involved the developers of the new scheme and not the population to be 
directly affected. The river basin committee, which should serve as an arena to resolve 
conflicts, closed the door to the traditional communities and local residents (Vainer et al. 
2004). Examples like Itaocara lead to the conclusion that the river committee remains under 
the sphere of influence of existing power structures, which are committed to maintain the 
water reforms within the boundaries of the IWRM model.  
Public involvement in the activities of the CEIVAP has been characterised by a 
persistent asymmetry in the opportunities to contribute to the decision-making process. As 
observed by Cornwall (2004: 84), “having a voice depends on more than getting a seat at the 
table”. The verticalisation of decision-making power in activities of the local committee has 
at least two causes: one is the established elitism of the Brazilian electoral system, which has 
profound reflexes on any attempt to broaden public participation. The other cause is the 
strategic relevance of the PSRB experience for the new national model of water management 
(under the 1997 legislation), which led to an exaggerated influence of national stakeholder 
groups in local affairs. In other words, too much is at stake in the Paraíba do Sul and, to a 
large extent, the overall success of the new national framework hinged on the local results. 
Thereby, the national government, particularly through the National Water Agency (ANA), 
spent a significant effort to translate the law into practice using the CEIVAP as a form of 
‘test tube’. Among the new regulatory instruments, the successful adoption of water charges 
in the PSRB was seen as highly important for the political and administrative justification of 
the new Agency (ANA superintendent, pers. comm.). Another reason for taking the PSRB as 
a national showcase is the fact that the majority of ANA’s directors have come from the 
states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo and, therefore, have been personally involved (or have 
a personal interest) in the regulatory experience in the Paraíba do Sul. But the prioritisation 
of the river basin by ANA led other sectors, industry in particular, to escalate their 
involvement in the activities of the river basin committee and, as a result, even with a 
minority of seats, these powerful voices have been able to control important decisions in the 
river basin committee (cf. Sousa Jr, 2004).  
The disputes between the federal administration and influential economic players 
have dominated the existence of the new committee and, crucially, shaped the interpretation 
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of water management problems and the formulation of responses. Due to the limited space 
available for other stakeholders in the committee, there was a gradual departure from the 
social and natural problems to a concentration of efforts on trying to maintain existing 
sectoral advantages. Schematically, it is possible to separate the committee members into 
three hierarchical levels (see Table 2). On the top level are the stronger players, namely civil 
servants from the federal government (in particular, from ANA) and the representatives of 
the industrial and agriculture sectors. The second hierarchical level is more heterogeneous 
and includes state and municipal administrations, NGO representatives, water utilities, 
colleges, syndicates and the representation of professional categories. The groups in the 
second hierarchical level have much less influence in the activities of the river basin 
committee when compared with the core groups, and also tend to compete with each other 
for resource and space. For instance, in some of our interviews there was a bitter criticism of 
professional NGO campaigners that (apparently) get involved in CEIVAP only to secure 
funds for their own projects (in other interviews, some NGOs confirmed that have been hired 
by CEIVAP to organise training and awareness raising campaigns). As a NGO activist 
conceded:  
 
“The meetings of the committee [CEIVAP] have been largely ineffective: those that should be critical 
of the problems, like the NGOs, remain quiet because they want to raise funds for their own activities 
[through the committee] and don’t want to contradict the strong voices of ANA and industry 
representatives” - NGO activist and observer of CEIVAP activities (interview in May 07). 
 
Similarly, the academic community has its own hidden agenda in relation to the 
internal activities of the committee. It is no secret that during the first decade of CEIVAP the 
same group of academics from Rio de Janeiro universities was hired to produce plans, reports 
and computer models (sometimes with the veiled collaboration of civil servants that are 
themselves responsible for supervising the work of the consultants). Such distortions seem 
widespread in the activities of the local river basin committee and can be related to the 
observation of the Transparency International (2008) that, because IWRM introduces 
unnecessary complexity, it opens new opportunities for rent-seeking (i.e. corruption) 
associated with the development of new procedures and methodologies.  
There is still a third hierarchical level among the stakeholders involved in CEIVAP, 
but the influence of these participants is much less noticeable. It includes traditional water 
users (small farmers, fishermen, local residents, etc.) and representatives from local 
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organisations (not necessarily NGOs). These groups have had major difficulties to take part 
in the committee activities, only attending meetings as observers. Their involvement is not 
directly precluded, but the subtle formalities of the committee procedures act as a 
disincentive for those less familiar with the intricacies of the new water management model. 
The stakeholders that occupy this third hierarchical level are sometimes blamed by the more 
influential committee members for “not understanding the importance of the CEIVAP 
decisions” (cf. interview with a director of the committee). Nonetheless, in their interviews, 
representatives of traditional water users even complained about the jargon used in the 
committee meetings, fraught with acronyms, rules and conventions. That indicates the 
formation of a cognitive field that systematically leaves out those unable to grasp the details 
of the new water regulatory doctrine.  
 
Table 2. Hierarchy of Social Groups within the River Basin Committee (CEIVAP) 
Hierarchical 
levels  
Stakeholder  
groups  Key interests Key attitudes 
1st level  
federal 
government 
press for the implementation of 
the new water regulatory 
framework (Law 9433/1997) 
influence the river basin committee 
(CEIVAP) through grants and reports; 
use the CEIVAP as model for other 
catchments 
business       
(industry) 
secure minimal regulation and  
lowest bulk water charges 
dominate the political debate; 
commission of specialised consultancy; 
legal challenges  
business 
(agriculture) exemption from water charges 
complain about the difficulties to 
continue agriculture production and 
about the impossibility to bear 
additional charges 
2nd level 
state 
governments 
adjust the national regulatory 
framework to their financial 
and political needs 
blame federal agencies for the 
difficulties to implement state water 
legislations  
municipal 
governments 
secure funds for local 
investments in local projects 
formalise political alliances with 
neighbour towns via consortium  of 
municipalities (established in tributaries 
of the Paraíba do Sul River) 
environmental 
NGOs 
expand the environmental 
debate; secure funds for their 
own activities 
criticise polluters and other water users 
for environmental degradation in the 
catchment   
social NGOs expand the environmental justice debate 
see the water resources sector as an 
opportunity of public mobilisation 
3rd level 
traditional water 
users 
seek the recognition of their 
traditional water rights  normally sceptical about the innovative character and the ultimate contribution 
of CEIVAP civil society representatives 
environmental restoration of 
the catchment  
 
This hierarchy of stakeholders is obviously only a simplified representation of a 
complex, nuanced web of interaction and disputes in the PSRB and in the river basin 
committee in particular. Even though, it probably helps to summarise the diversity of 
interests and the unevenness of decision power. The three layers of authority certainly existed 
 20 
before the establishment of CEIVAP, but existing asymmetries have been significantly 
reinforced by the technocratic and centralised implementation of the new water management 
model. Instead of focusing on ecological restoration and on the satisfaction of the demands of 
the majority of the local population, in practice the new regulation concentrated power and 
resources in the hands of the catchment administrative bureaucracy, which is by and large 
subordinated to the interests of the stronger stakeholder groups. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The recent experience of reforming water regulation in the PSRB vividly 
demonstrates the epistemological, operational and political limitations of the IWRM model 
mentioned above. Despite various institutional changes promoted under the influence of the 
international theory, environmental problems are still not properly addressed by the river 
basin committee or the environmental regulators. Notwithstanding repeated claims of success 
by official publications or academic papers (published by those directly involved in the 
implementation of new regulation), the river basin remains in a seriously degraded condition. 
The same processes that damaged the river system in the past continue to compromise the 
ecological stability and the quality of life of local communities in the present (e.g. untreated 
effluent discharges, unmitigated river engineering, soil erosion, etc). The fundamental 
distortion is related to the priority given to the introduction of bulk water charges in the 
PSRB, which is always a highly divisive instrument of environmental management in any 
part of the world where it is adopted. The controversy about the charges has indeed poisoned 
the tenuous public mobilisation that started in the river basin in the 1990s, without raising 
sufficient funds to restore environmental quality and without inducing a more responsible use 
of water resources.  
In the same way, the new regulatory framework has largely underestimated the social 
complexity and the political struggles that unfold in the river basin. In particular, our research 
identified a persistent reluctance to address the political dimension of water management 
among the members of the river basin committee. As a result, there is little recognition of the 
fact that the regulatory reforms have been systematically manipulated by the central 
government, via its water agency (ANA), and by the stronger economic groups, industry in 
particular. Evidently, the local residents and small water users are not passive about the 
condition of their river basin and try to occupy, as much as possible, the political space 
available to them in the new regulatory structure. Nonetheless, it is difficult to expect a 
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sustained progress towards environmental sustainability without a more democratised basis 
of water management and the removal of political inequalities historically established in the 
PSRB. As pointed out by Middleton and O’Keefe (2001:16), “unless analyses of 
development begin not with the symptoms, environmental or economic instability, but with 
the cause, social injustice, then no development can be sustainable”. This observation seems 
to be immensely relevant to understand the hitherto contradictory results of water use and 
conservation in the Paraíba do Sul and, certainly, in other Brazilian river basins.  
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1 SINGREH is an administrative structure that extends from the federal government to state 
authorities and river basin committees. More than 140 river basin committees and 10,000 
professionals are currently involved in the activities of the SINGREH. 
2 The river basin includes 55,500 km2 between latitudes 20°26’ and 23°00’. The average flow 
at the river mouth is 1,118.40 m3/s, with low flow (Q95) of 353.77 m3/s. The extension of the 
main river is around 1,100 km; the river network extends over 180 municipalities in the states 
of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. More than 5.4 million people live in the 
catchment (Coppetec, 2006).    
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3 It is still possible to visit many of the lavish manor houses of the then affluent rural 
aristocracy, which included 32 noble titles among barons, viscounts and two earls (listed in 
Siqueira, in Müller, 1969). 
4 It is beyond the objectives of this paper to describe the full range of environmental problems 
in the Paraíba do Sul, but detailed assessment and analysis are available in Coppetec (2002 
and 2006).   
5 Water management problems extend beyond the catchment boundaries via a complicated 
interconnection between the Paraíba do Sul and the Guandu Rivers. It has the capacity to 
transfer around 160 m3/s, which represents two thirds of the Paraíba do Sul water flow at the 
point of abstraction. From the Guandu River, water is further diverted to serve 80% of the 
population of the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area (i.e. more than 12 million people depend 
on the Paraíba do Sul for their water supply). Because of the interbasin transfer, the Paraíba 
do Sul is significantly depleted of water in its medium section, aggravating an already 
precarious environmental condition. 
6 Membership in the CEIVAP is distributed between water users (24 seats), representatives of 
the federal, state and municipal governments (21 seats) and civil society organisations (15 
seats). It should be mentioned that civil society representation has been systematically abused 
by the appointment of members of business federations, professional councils and 
consortiums of municipalities instead of genuine civil society representatives (Projeto Marca 
d’Água, 2003). 
7 According to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, water has dual ownership: 1) federal, for those 
rivers that cross more than one state or are shared with other countries; and 2) state 
responsibility, for those confined to one state territory.  
8 Sub-basin committees have a legal mandate similar to the river basin committee, while 
municipal consortia have more targeted objectives, such as waste and sanitation. 
9 Because of the importance given to this issue, our research strategy was revised in the 
second month of the fieldwork and passed to consider the controversy around water user 
charges as the main indicator of the effectiveness of the institutional reforms in the PSRB. 
10 The implementation of charges started in 2003, after an initial registration of 4,500 water 
users in the river basin (Braga et al., 2008). All water uses above a certain threshold (i.e. 
consumptive use above 1 litre/second and hydropower bigger than 1 MW) must pay a 
monthly charge, calculated taking into account the extraction rate, the percentage of use and 
the quality of the effluent. There is a standard charge (R$ 0.02/m3) for industries, water 
supply and mining, and significant discounts for agriculture and aquaculture.  
11 US$ 1.00 is approximately R$ 2.00. 
